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ABSTRACT In this article, I explore how people use the culture concept in legislatures to understand the minorities they legislate for
and about. I focus on recent debates in the New Zealand parliament over whether the indigenous Ma¯ori are a cultural group or a racial
group. A Westminster parliament system encourages these debates, in which political parties argue that Ma¯ori are either cultural or
racial but not both. For the ruling Labour Party and its allies, Ma¯ori are cultural; for their opposition, the National Party and its allies,
Ma¯ori are a racial group. This division is possible only because of the legislators’ neoliberal assumptions about identity categories. To
complicate these political divisions, Ma¯ori MPs currently belong to political parties from all parts of the political spectrum, and their
effectiveness as culture bearers in a parliamentary context can disrupt the terms of this debate. [Keywords: democratic representation,
indigeneity, culture concept, legislatures, New Zealand]
W HEN ANTHROPOLOGISTS turn their ethno-graphic attention to how the culture concept
travels, they find that institutional contexts configure what
counts as cultural and what counts as acultural. In do-
ing so, these institutions also determine the consequences
of classifying with the culture concept, both for the peo-
ple who apply the concept and for those to whom it
gets applied (Briggs 2001; Dusenbery 1997; Handler 1988;
Santiago-Irizarry 1996; Taylor 2003). For example, Vilma
Santiago-Irizarry recounts how culture becomes “an ar-
ray of psychologized symptoms” (Santiago-Irizarry 1996:3)
when psychiatrists use culture as a lens for understand-
ing mental illnesses among their patients, affecting how
the psychiatrists treat those patients they interpret as cul-
ture bearers (Santiago-Irizarry 1996). Similarly, Bonnie Urci-
uoli finds that administrators in liberal arts colleges under-
stand experience with culture, and more specifically with
cultural diversity, to be part of a skill set that these col-
leges can now provide students (in press). In this article, I
turn to legislatures and explore how members of the New
Zealand/Aotearoa parliament deploy culture and race as op-
posing classificatory categories when debating policies af-
fecting the indigenous Ma¯ori.
The act of legislating often raises a difficult question:
How should one classify a group so as to make it into an
appropriate legislative object? People enlist culture, along
with race, ethnicity, and similar identity categories, when
framing their constituents as members of groups requiring
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legislative action. Each category contains its own legisla-
tive possibilities and constraints. I use a limited form of dis-
course analysis to analyze the competing classifications po-
litical parties use to discuss legislation and policies viewed
as addressing Ma¯ori concerns (see Chock 1991, 1996 for
parallel analyses of classificatory categories used in the U.S.
Congress). The parliamentary debates surrounding Ma¯ori
as cultural are heavily influenced by the neoliberal assump-
tion that culture is a useful skill set that can assist people in
their market relations, an idea voiced by some members of
all political parties with the exception of the Ma¯ori Party. I
discuss how these debates are neoliberal and then address
how the presence of Ma¯ori members of parliament (MPs)
complicates these debates.
From 2003 to 2006, the New Zealand parliament ex-
plored the hazards of making culture an explicit basis
for legislation in debates between the ruling Labour Party
and its allies and the opposing National Party and its al-
lies.1 New Zealand ethnographers have discussed the ways
culture has been essentialized for different New Zealand
publics (Fleras and Spoonley 2000; Goldsmith 2003; Mur-
ray 2000; Sissons 1993; Webster 1998). Michael Goldsmith
has pointed out the costs of adopting “culturespeak” inNew
Zealand institutions (Goldsmith 2003). In parliament, the
recent ways people essentialize culture has changed how
culture and race as terms are interwoven. Often when cul-
ture is a term linking people and their practices, it is used in
mutually constitutive relationships with other terms such
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as race or class (Segal 1998; Urciuoli 1996; Wetherell and
Potter 1992). Typically it is impossible to make reference
to race without implicitly also making reference to culture
(Wade 1993). What is intriguing about the 2003–06 de-
bates in the New Zealand parliament is that the two major
political parties no longer exhibited this tendency to imply
culture when speaking about race, or vice versa. The Labour
Party, traditionally liberal, insisted on viewingMa¯ori as cul-
tural, a definition also referring to Ma¯ori’s historical cen-
trality in founding New Zealand/Aotearoa as a nation. In
particular, the Labour Party and its allies described Ma¯ori
as a cultural group with special status as the indigenous
partner to the Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi, a doc-
ument signed in 1840 in which Ma¯ori granted the Queen
(contested) authority in exchange for various protections
over land, fisheries, and taonga (lit., treasures).2 The Na-
tional Party, traditionally conservative, shifted in its under-
standing of how to engage with New Zealand/Aotearoa’s
origins legislatively, the better to oppose Labour. They as-
serted that culture has no place in construing a legisla-
tive object and advocated that legislation should be with-
out reference to race or culture. In this sense, culture and
race mutually constitute each other in New Zealand par-
liamentary debates as opposing concepts with political
consequences.
The paradoxes of democratic representation ensure
that the current division between culture and race is un-
stable. Legislators attribute Ma¯oriness to Ma¯ori discussed in
Parliament in different ways than they attribute Ma¯oriness
to Ma¯ori who speak in Parliament. The Ma¯ori discussed
might be either cultural or racial, depending on one’s polit-
ical affiliations. But Ma¯ori who speak will only accept being
culture bearers, speaking for an otherness that carries with
it political obligation. This is one of the few political stances
that Ma¯ori from all political parties seem to agree on. Ma¯ori
MPs rarely speak with a unified voice, as there is little agree-
ment about what is in Ma¯ori’s best interests. But all Ma¯ori
MPs seem to agree that Ma¯ori MPs are representing a cul-
tural group when they speak for Ma¯ori and that they, as
representatives, share with their Ma¯ori constituents a nu-
anced and distinct perspective. The presence of the newly
formed Ma¯ori Party has only serves to cement this stance,
as I discuss later. Having Ma¯ori speaking in Parliament, in-
sisting that their parliamentary consociates acknowledge
and legislate based on Ma¯ori MPs’ own understanding of
what it means to be Ma¯ori, changes how the politics of
recognition plays out in the New Zealand parliament. New
Zealand legislators who are not Ma¯ori must take into ac-
count the unusually unified response by Ma¯ori MPs—their
political allies—to the question of how to define Ma¯ori as
an appropriate legislative object.
This has broader implications for indigenous peo-
ple worldwide, because New Zealand’s history offers rare
insight into the benefits and costs of indigenous self-
representation in a national legislature. Indigenous self-
representation affects not only how Ma¯ori interests are
represented but also how Ma¯ori are understood legisla-
tively to be constituted as social groups. The New Zealand
parliament is a historically rich site for examining how
people use the culture concept in democratic representa-
tion as well as for analyzing the conundrums of classifi-
cation that often accompany political representation. New
Zealand/Aotearoa has the longest history of indigenous self-
representation in a national legislature. In 1867, four seats
were reserved in the House of Representatives for Ma¯ori
to represent themselves, a number that increased when
the government switched to mixed member proportional
representation in 1996. The recent 2005 election gave 21
seats to Ma¯ori out of 120 total seats, with the Ma¯ori Party
in control of four of these seats. In addition, since 1975,
Ma¯ori politicians have also been regularly elected to gen-
eral seats that are not decided by votes from the Ma¯ori
electoral roll (Wanna 2005). Ma¯ori presence in parliament
has been influential over the past 140 years in shaping leg-
islation that supports one of the more successful indige-
nous rights movements. Ma¯ori MPs intervene significantly,
influencing parliamentary debates about Ma¯ori as a popu-
lation, an object of public policy, and a group with unique
claims on the government. Most recently, Ma¯ori MPs have
had to figure out how best to advocate for their Ma¯ori con-
stituents when faced with various neoliberal definitions of
culture.
I have divided this article into three parts. First, I dis-
cuss literature on indigenous self-representation. Second, I
focus on how culture is mobilized to describe Ma¯ori as a
legislative object in a neoliberal context. Finally, I move
beyond the discussion of the political debates surrounding
whether Ma¯ori are a culture or a race, asking what hap-
pens when Ma¯ori figure not simply as a population under
discussion but also as political consociates with whom one
debates and compromises.
THE CONSTRUCTION OF REPRESENTATION
What do anthropologists bring to questions surrounding
democratic representation?3 One helpful intervention has
been to point out that the categories themselves—gender,
race, and culture—are not givens but, rather, are constantly
constructed in the moment of their performance in legisla-
tures (see Chock 1991, 1996). To ask how minorities repre-
sent themselves is also to ask how that particular identity
category is constructed and what ideas of representation
are presumed. The burgeoning anthropological literature
on indigenous self-representation, largely based in Latin
America, explores relationships between cultural and po-
litical representation. These scholars tend to address polit-
ical representation outside of legislatures, focusing on in-
digenous activism and political strategies that various Latin
American indigenous peoples have developed to navigate
their nations’ politics of recognition (Conklin 1997;Warren
and Jackson 2002).4 They turn ethnographically to people’s
“political self-consciousness” (Warren and Jackson 2002),
424 American Anthropologist • Vol. 110, No. 4 • December 2008
asking when and how indigeneity becomes a basis for social
movements and critiques and observing how indigenous
advocates invoke the culture concept to legitimate their
claims on the state. Kay Warren and Jean Jackson discuss
this idea, countering possible critiques by suggesting that
“for anthropologists, the issue is not proving or disproving
a particular essentialized view of culture but rather exam-
ining the way essences are constructed in practice and dis-
puted in political rhetoric” (2002:9). In examining how and
when indigenous people choose to essentialize their culture
for political reasons, these scholars also explore what parts
of their culture are turned into a political resource (Conklin
1997; Jackson 1991, 1995; Ramos 1998). Many studies ex-
plore transformations between how people perform their
political acumen and cultural expertise within their indige-
nous communities and how they perform for NGO or state
officials (Conklin and Graham 1995; Oakdale 2004;Warren
and Jackson 2002).
Anthropologists studying indigenous self-representa-
tion insist that the medium employed shapes how these
representations circulate and create their effects (Conklin
1997; Graham 2002). In analyzing Brazilian Amazonian
self-representations, Laura Graham calls attention to the
distinctive ways language and language ideologies influ-
ence representations (Graham 2002). Graham focuses on
how Brazilian language ideologies present savvy indigenous
spokespeople with potential pitfalls when they are faced
with the challenges of fashioning an indigenous persona
that performs authenticity in ways that are recognizable
to the nonindigenous Brazilian gaze. Current Ma¯ori MPs
rarely encounter a comparable struggle to produce a puta-
tively authentic Ma¯ori presence: this is a battle that took
place more frequently 20 or 30 years ago.5 Yet Graham’s
intervention does not hinge on questions of authenticity
alone. She recommends that ethnographers examine the
tension between people’s ideas about language and their
actual speaking practices when studying indigenous po-
litical representation. This is particularly appropriate for
parliaments, because almost all parliamentary labor centers
on producing texts—that is, laws as well as parliamentary
transcripts.
For example, in the New Zealand parliament, Ma¯ori
MPs will speak in Ma¯ori, addressing the other MPs who are
present and, implicitly, those constituents listening.6 Te
Uroroa Flavell (Ma¯ori Party) addressed the Speaker of the
House (who is not Ma¯ori) in the following manner:
I te tuatahi, e pa¯tai noa ake ana ki a koe Madam Speaker
kia waiho te¯nei pa¯tai mo¯ a¯po¯po¯ i te mea, ka¯ore te Minita
i konei.
I seek leave, Madam Speaker, to have this question left
for tomorrow because the Minister is not present. [New
Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, May 23, 2006, Te Uroroa
Flavell, MP]
This sentence does not contain Ma¯ori-inflected con-
cepts. Flavell is performing standard parliamentary business
that could be done as effectively in English as it could in
Ma¯ori. Graham suggests that to understand such indige-
nous self-representation, one should pay attention to how
language as a medium functions as a second-order indexi-
cality, a concept introduced by Michael Silverstein (1998,
2003). She defines second-order indexicality as “the pro-
cesses by which signs take on novel indexical meanings in
new contexts that were only latent in earlier ones” (Graham
2002:190), arguing that speaking an indigenous language
signifies far more than the semantic content of the utter-
ance. The indigenous language itself references the chain
of associations linked to that local manifestation of indi-
geneity: “Ma¯oriness” or “Indianness,” for example. In the
example above, speaking Ma¯ori accomplishes two tasks,
made possible because the Ma¯ori language is largely inter-
preted as a second-order index in parliament: first, Flavell
reminds his audience of Ma¯ori’s status as an equal partner
in fashioning New Zealand/Aotearoa as a nation, especially
because Ma¯ori and English are New Zealand’s official lan-
guages; second, he asks implicitly that the MPs (and the
parliament’s larger audience) who do not understandMa¯ori
engage with the systemic exclusions that Ma¯ori experience
in non-Ma¯ori contexts. He refuses to be one of the few com-
pelled to be culturally out of place in parliament.7 In other
instances, Ma¯ori members are also using Ma¯ori to insist on
the untranslatibility of Ma¯ori concepts and, in doing so, to
emphasize the distinctiveness of a Ma¯ori perspective.
Expanding on Graham’s insight, all representations
of Ma¯ori in parliament are ones in which the message’s
second-order indexicality predominates, especially because
politicians do not generally understand parliament to be a
Ma¯ori context. Speaking in parliament as a Ma¯ori or about
being Ma¯ori always provides emblems of Ma¯oriness with
novel (legislative) meanings that perhaps were implicit in
the sign’s other contexts. For example, in otherMa¯ori politi-
cal contexts, how a speaker is connected to others genealog-
ically or through iwi or hapu¯ (often translated as tribes or
subtribes) is crucial. In parliament, Ma¯ori speakers rarely
mention their iwi or hapu¯ affiliation.8 They tend to speak as
representatives of Ma¯oridom, rather than as representatives
of Ma¯ori-specific social unities. WhenMa¯ori iwi or hapu¯ are
discussed in parliament, it is almost always as legal objects
to be addressed under the Treaty of Waitangi. As ethnog-
raphers of Latin American indigenous representation have
noted, internal divisions often fall away when indigeneity
or Indianness is treated as second-order indexicality (War-
ren and Jackson 2002). Parliament as a context provides a
similar kind of filter, ensuring the dominant focus is on
Ma¯oridom as a whole. In short, second-order indexicality is
the order of the day when Ma¯oriness is a legislative object
or a public marker of a legislator’s identity.
I am distinguishing parliament as an institution from
government institutions in general, and the courts in par-
ticular. Scholars have noted that court officials character-
ize indigenous people as cultural in substantively different
ways than I have found that legislators do. For example,
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in the New Zealand parliament, Ma¯ori, whether framed as
cultural or as racial, are not necessarily defined by their pre-
colonial practices, which Elizabeth Povinelli argues is the
case in courts. Povinelli claims that the liberal nation-state
views indigenous people seeking redress as unfortunately
corrupted representatives of the precontact cultural other
(Povinelli 2002). Indigenous people are presumed to have
knowledge of what traditional laws and other practices used
to be prior to colonialism or modernity. They do not live
according to these principles currently, because they are
forced to navigate modern systems, such as the capitalist
market. According to Povinelli, this failure to be properly
culturally other undermines indigenous claims for redress.9
This is not how being indigenous is discussed in the New
Zealand parliament, a nation with its unique history of in-
digenous relations. For the most part, New Zealand parlia-
mentarians describe Ma¯ori culture as a distinct changing
culture. Pakekura Horomia, the Ma¯ori Labour Minister of
Ma¯ori Affairs, argues that “custom and ritual are still strong
for us, but culture is not static, and Ma¯ori must not hold
themselves back by not being prepared for modern times
and not getting modern skills” (New Zealand, Parliamentary
Debates, February 2, 2005). Although not always stated so
explicitly, generally in parliament culture is taken to be a
worldview motivating a set of practices that people use to
organize their contemporary lives.10
MA¯ORI AS NEOLIBERAL RACE, MA¯ORI
AS NEOLIBERAL CULTURE
In this article I focus on the consequences of invoking
culture when debating indigeneity in parliament. Yet dis-
cussing indigeneity is not in fact when people most fre-
quently use the term culture in the New Zealand parliament.
Members of all parties most often invoke a corporate notion
of “culture” when previously terms such as environment or
atmosphere might have been used.11 MPs of all political per-
suasions talk about “the culture of extravagance,” the “cul-
ture of saving,” or the “culture of dishonesty.”12 In these
moments, the speakers open up the possibility of change
by describing an environment of dishonesty as a culture
of dishonesty. Culture divorced from communities points
to a different kind of legislative possibility than Ma¯ori cul-
ture does, largely because these types of cultures are not
perspectives whereas people’s cultures are. The “culture of”
discourse points to practices without perspectives. To speak
of the “culture of” something opens up possibilities for
conscious and systematic transformations of the culture in
ways that people’s cultures (understood as tacitly held be-
liefs) cannot be changed. The speakers often suggest how
to transform the culture, whether through legislation, new
leadership, or conscious decisions. In addition, when speak-
ing about “culture of,” speakers are not merging people
and culture into a single legislative object. Instead, speak-
ers distinguish between people and their practices, making
only their loosely defined practices available for legislative
attention.
When National MPs hear the term culture in relation to
Ma¯ori, they view it as a codeword for race,13 as Tony Ryall
(National Party) implies when debating a tax bill exempting
Ma¯ori cultural organizations:
The bill has the quite innocent-sounding phrase “Ma¯ori
Organisations” in its title. . . . What it does have a lot
to do with is the provision of preferential tax treatment
on the basis of the colour of one’s skin, and that fact
is not reflected in the title. This bill has nothing to do
with setting up or establishing Ma¯ori organisations, and
everything to do with providing a tax break based solely
on the colour of someone’s skin. It is bad that that could
be allowed to happen. . . . The words “Race-based Tax
Rates” should be in the title because that is what is in
this bill. [New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, March 6,
2003, Tony Ryall, MP]
Ryall was one of many National MPs and National al-
lies who described legislation addressing Ma¯ori concerns as
race-based legislation or race-based laws.14 Other allies of
National, and in particular ACT New Zealand party mem-
bers, argued consistently against race-based laws or legis-
lations as well.15 For example, ACT MP Heather Roy, in
a general and sweeping critique of recent legislation, also
moves quickly from cultural assessment to race-based law:
I ask all parties to think about legislation of all sorts that
has been brought before the House of late. Cultural as-
sessment of all sorts has become a trendwith this Govern-
ment. It is becoming a very big part of its bills, and alsowe
are seeing the specific singling out ofMa¯ori.We should in
this country have one law for all people, not race-based
law. What we are seeing here is, again, a perpetuation of
the push towards the promotion, the singling out, of sep-
arate ethnic groups within our society. What that does
in effect is cause separatism, not a united New Zealand.
[New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, October 23, 2003,
Heather Roy, MP]
By insisting that what Labour and its allies call “cul-
ture” is in fact race, National MPs and their allies can ad-
vocate for changes in policies that they believe privilege
one race over another: for example, eliminating the seven
parliamentary seats currently designated only for Ma¯ori.
Historically culture and culture loss has been the category
Ma¯ori used to demand restitutions from the state. Defin-
ing Ma¯ori as racial is a way to sidestep obligations aris-
ing from historical injustices. National MPs instead frame
Ma¯ori problems in terms of contemporary economic in-
equalities. Through these techniques, the National Party
tries to eliminate Ma¯ori as a population requiring special
legislation.
To examine the National Party’s perspective in detail,
I turn to former National leader Don Brash’s speech to the
Orewa Rotary Club on January 27, 2004.16 This was the
first speech in which Brash delineated for the New Zealand
public why he views Ma¯ori as a race first and foremost
and views culture as a group’s secondary—and legislatively
inconsequential—characteristic. This speech also answers
the question “why now?” Why would National legislators
distinguish between culture and race now, in this particular
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political climate? Brash’s speech reveals that this political
strategy extends a neoliberal logic; it emerges from a New
Zealand neoliberal take on what it means to have a cul-
ture.17 And who better to delineate the New Zealand ne-
oliberal perspective on identity categories than the former
governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand?
In his Orewa speech, Brash outlines his principles for
refusing to accept that Ma¯ori can be an object of legislation
because of their culture. He acknowledges thatMa¯ori have a
culture as well as are a race but argues that having a culture
does not lead to a group identity that legislation should
address. Thus, any legislation that addresses being Ma¯ori
is legislation built on “preferences based on race” (New
Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, December 16, 2003, Don
Brash MP). Generally Brash claims that culture is not legiti-
mate as a basis for a group because it is a skill set, something
that people can consciously use in the marketplace. Brash
and other neoliberals view the self as a bundle of usable
traits that can be selectively employed to forge profitable
alliances. This has implications for how National members
understand their constituents’ needs. They don’t use cul-
ture to place an individual within a context (however that
context is defined); instead, they try to identify the traits
that individuals possess the better to lump together people
who share similar traits.18 Brash describes culture explicitly
as a trait that assists one in the market at two moments in
his speech. First, he suggests that Ma¯oriness entails a flexi-
bility that can serve one in good stead in rapidly changing
contexts:
in spite of all the turmoil, the shocks from the collision
of two cultures and the chaos of unprecedented social
change, the documentary evidence clearly shows that
Ma¯ori society was immensely adaptable, and very open
to new ways. That adaptability and resourcefulness, that
openness to opportunity, that entrepreneurial spirit, is
something that survived the trauma of colonisation, and
is today reflected in a Ma¯ori renaissance across a wide
range of business, cultural and sporting activity. [Brash,
Orewa Rotary Club speech, January 27, 2004]
It is no accident that Brash equates adaptability and
resourcefulness with having an entrepreneurial spirit. For
Brash, Ma¯oriness is but one path to the entrepreneurial
spirit, one of many possible approaches toward learning
techniques for entering into market relationships. It allows
people to enter into alliances with others, potentially of-
fering the skill set of Ma¯oriness as a complement to people
with other skill sets.
Second, Brash argues that one can choose to develop
this particular skill set over other skill sets. He is not op-
posed to teaching people how to be Ma¯ori if they are bi-
ologically capable—that is, racially Ma¯ori. And in making
this argument, he stresses in the following passage the fact
that this is a choice, similar to any other choice structured
by market rationality:
Similarly, a National Government will continue to fund
Te Kohanga Reo, Kaupapa Ma¯ori, Wananga and Ma¯ori
primary health providers—not because we have been
conned into believing that that is somehow a special
right enjoyed by Ma¯ori under the Treaty, but, rather, be-
cause National believes that all New Zealanders have a
right to choice in education and health. [Brash, Orewa
Rotary Club speech, January 27, 2004]
Here, he rejects the idea that being Ma¯ori entails his-
torical claims on the nation, insisting instead that being
Ma¯ori is a bundle of skills that one can choose to develop,
if biologically Ma¯ori. Brash accepts here the premise that
the government might be responsible for ensuring that any
citizen is properly educated for the marketplace. Because
Ma¯oriness is a variant of entrepreneurial spirit, this en-
tails offering educational opportunities to learn how to be
Ma¯ori.
For Brash, Ma¯ori culture is one skill set among many,
and thus it can not serve as the basis for political distinctive-
ness. Brash argues for a specifically New Zealand neoliberal
perspective, one that contrasts with howneoliberals address
indigenous claims elsewhere. Several scholars have pointed
out that culture does not pose the challenges to neoliberal
capitalism that culture has posed in the past to other forms
of capitalism (see Comaroff and Comaroff 2007; Coombe
2005; Hale 2006). Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff as
well as Charles Hale argue that indigenous groups can now
use their cultural identity as grounds for becoming corpo-
rate entities and that a limited cultural unity is acceptable
to neoliberal organizations when framed as the source of
a corporate mandate. Outside of New Zealand, neoliberals
can tolerate culture as long as those claiming culture form a
social unity that for all intents and purposes is a corporate
entity.
Brash—as well as the National Party as a whole—
is unwilling to grant Ma¯ori such status, largely because
this would reconfigure the Treaty partnership between the
British Crown and Ma¯ori into a partnership between two
corporate entites. The Treaty ofWaitangi, understood as the
originary document of the New Zealand nation, is consid-
ered a legal contract structuring New Zealand/Aotearoa as
a nation and a partnership in which Ma¯ori and the Crown
are equal Treaty partners. For the National Party, all part-
nerships are inherently alliances based on market princi-
ples, and thus the Treaty allows Ma¯ori to claim a unique
business standing. Brash spends most of his Orewa speech
arguing against this possibility, insisting that Ma¯ori should
not occupy a unique position in relationship to the nation.
He is particularly concerned that they will be (wrongly)
privileged when entering into business alliances. This trep-
idation is apparent in the following passage:
Ma¯ori also gain a new role in the management of the
entire coastline. Customary title will give commercial de-
velopment rights, which over time will inevitably erode
public access. In addition, 16 newly created bureaucracies
will give Ma¯ori a more dominant role than other New
Zealanders in the use and development of the coastline
. . . Ma¯ori will gain access to even more taxpayers’ funds
for consultants, lawyers and hui [Ma¯ori public meetings]
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to “build capacity” to take part in this process. [Brash,
Orewa Rotary Club speech, January 27, 2004]
Brash is concerned that the Treaty frames Ma¯ori as
fundamentally different kinds of citizens and, hence, inap-
propriately advantaged businesspeople. From a neoliberal
perspective, governments’ primary function is to maintain
environments conducive to marketplaces. Defining Ma¯ori
as special because of their indigeneity undercuts the govern-
ment’s ideological responsibility to create equitable market
conditions.
Brash hopes to create “one standard of citizenship for
all” by viewing Ma¯ori as first and foremost a race and see-
ing culture is a secondary skill set relevant only for entering
marketplaces. “One standard of citizenship for all” refers
to equitable market alliances: that is, Brash does not want
some to be disproportionately advantaged because of their
historical relationship to the nation’s origins. Brash chooses
to privilege race over culture tomake historical connections
less salient. Race becomes an acultural category for Brash
precisely because it is not a skill set. Race is, in his evident
understanding, a biological trait that has (in an ideal ne-
oliberal world) no impact on how one engages with the
market. Even race is a category he is reluctant to use to
suggest that Ma¯ori are a distinct group, because he under-
stands all Ma¯ori to be too racially mixed. In this speech, and
subsequently, Brash keeps referring to his impression that
there are no “pure” Ma¯ori left: everyone currently claim-
ing to be Ma¯ori is the result of many intermarriages.19 For
Brash, claiming that Ma¯ori are a race, however putatively
impure, allows him to extend National’s neoliberal logic to
argue against Ma¯ori as a legislatively distinct population.
Now that Brash is no longer the head of the National Party,
no MP is publicly claiming that Ma¯ori are a vanishing race.
Yet National Party members still argue that any legislation
or representation geared toward Ma¯ori is race based and,
hence, illegitimate.
Labour, by contrast, insists that the Ma¯ori population
remain a central object of legislation. In doing so, Labour
is not rejecting a neoliberal perspective on culture. Labour
and National politicians agree, in fact, that culture can of-
fer an important skill set. Both agree that culture can be
New Zealand’s solution to the problem of meeting global-
ization’s demands for specialized skills. Chris Carter, Labour
Minister for Ethnic Affairs, suggests an argument for diver-
sity based on the marketplace:
The diversity of the world is now a global market, and
if young people in New Zealand are aware of cultural
difference, and appreciate and celebrate other cultures,
they are enriched and stronger in embracing those cul-
tures. They should inevitably do that because of the way
barriers are breaking down in the world. [New Zealand,
Parliamentary Debates, February 11, 2003]
For Carter, and other Labour politicians, managing cul-
tural difference is a skill set that the government can help
foster. Where the Labour Party and National Party split
is that Labour insists on seeing culture as also a perspec-
tive, not just a skill set alone. Labour politicians claim
that a nation’s culturally diverse population is comprised
of groups holding different and equally valid perspectives.
They may share common goals. For example, every family
wants to raise healthy and flourishing children, although
the paths toward these shared goals are culturally distinct.20
The dilemma thus is writing laws to promote common goals
while allowing people to reach these goals via their differ-
ent cultural paths. Prime Minister Helen Clark, in rebutting
Don Brash’s Orewa speech, outlines this stance:
I think the challenge for us in New Zealand is to keep
building in our small country the tolerance and mu-
tual respect for each other that allow diverse peoples to
live alongside each other in peace. Trying to enforce a
monoculture that does not allow for diversity of culture,
heritage, and belief would be a disaster for this country.
[NewZealand, Parliamentary Debates,November 15, 2005,
Helen Clark PM]
The Labour Party is continuing legislative efforts begun
in 1975 when parliament founded the Waitangi Tribunal
to adjudicate Ma¯ori claims of unfair land dealings. Labour
claims to be committed to historical redress and has re-
quired that all relevant legislation speak to Treaty princi-
ples. But the party is doing more than insisting that Ma¯ori
should have legislative status as Treaty partners. Labour
politicians assert that a Ma¯ori perspective is fundamentally
different than a European New Zealander perspective. Gov-
ernment coalition MPs will call on a Ma¯ori cultural logic
in their speeches. For example, Judy Turner (United Fu-
ture) says: “One of the aspects of tikanga [customs] Ma¯ori
that I most admire . . . is the concept that we move forward
into the future by backing into the future. My understand-
ing is that the thought is that we make decisions about
our future from that which we can learn from what has
gone before, and I admire that” (New Zealand, Parliamen-
tary Debates, March 26, 2003, Judy Turner MP). Judy Turner
argues that Ma¯ori have uniquely cultural relationships to
history, metaphorically spatialized as moving forward by
looking back to the past. When Labour definesMa¯ori as cul-
tural, then, the party claims that Ma¯ori have a worldview,
framed in a way that resonates with a much-critiqued an-
thropological concept of “cultural logic” (for anthropologi-
cal critiques, see Abu-Lughod 1991; Strathern 1995;Wagner
1981).
This raises a new question: How does this concept of
cultural logic, so similar to an anthropological one, affect
parliamentary decisions when legislators use the concept to
imagine the needs of the minorities that they legislate for
and about?21 Mostly Labour politicians argue for bureaucra-
cies that allow people to have a range of different cultural
approaches.22 Like many other neoliberals, they insist on
viewing government officials and the people they interact
with as allies in transactions structured according to market
principles. People requesting state housing or welfare bene-
fits are “clients” with their own skill sets, including culture.
At the same time, bureaucrats also have their own skill sets
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that allow them to make certain alliances with the clients.
The task legislators are faced with is devising policies that
encourage these alliances rather than hinder them. This
becomes clear in the following interchange between Steve
Maharey (Labour Minister of Housing), and Rodney Hide
(Leader of ACT and allied with the National Party):
RODNEYHIDE (Leader-ACT) to SteveMaharey (Minis-
ter of Housing):Does Housing New Zealand Corporation
have a “two-world view” of the Treaty of Waitangi; if so,
what two views of the world does Housing New Zealand
Corporation have?23
Hon. STEVE MAHAREY (Minister of Housing): No, the
corporation does not have a “two-world view” of the
Treaty of Waitangi. The corporation simply acknowl-
edges that different people have different ways of looking
at the world, often based on their distinct culture, tradi-
tions, and beliefs. [New Zealand Parliamentary Debates,
October 7, 2004, Rodney Hide MP and Steve Maharey
MP]
Throughout the much longer discussion, Steve Ma-
harey insisted on seeing cultural difference in terms of
points of view thatmight shape theways that clients should
be treated. Here culture is a potential obstacle for creat-
ing effective alliances as well as a potential basis for the
alliances. Culture becomes a legislative object precisely be-
cause the Labour party sees law and government policies as
vehicles for promoting alliances that have culture as a core
element.
Each political side understands culture through a ne-
oliberal lens. Culture for each party serves as a useful skill
set, one that helps people navigate complicated market-
based relationships. This motivates both parties to support
some government initiatives, such as language preschools.
The difference is that the National Party sees culture as one
of many usable traits that a person possesses, whereas the
Labour Party sees culture as a usable perspective. For the Na-
tional Party, usable traits should not be the grounds for leg-
islation: for example, why legislate based on whether some
people can speak a language in addition to English whereas
other English speakers cannot? Usable perspectives, unlike
usable traits, are a double-edged sword necessitating legisla-
tive attention, because perspectives serve as the basis for cer-
tain alliances but also undermine other interactions. Labour
insists that it is possible to create bureaucracies that support
multiple perspectives; indeed, the presence of multiple per-
spectives requires equitable government support. Cultural
perspectives provide challenges to government bureaucra-
cies that can be responded to legislatively. These contrast-
ing neoliberal conceptions of culture entail two distinct
legislative implications. The tension between these impli-
cations has led to the current debate about whether Ma¯ori
should be objects of legislation or not.
MA¯ORI AS MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
Ahistory of over 140 years of indigenous self-representation
in the New Zealand parliament means that the question of
how to characterizeMa¯ori cannot be distinguished from the
question of how to represent them politically. For example,
if Ma¯ori are characterized as a race, then the Ma¯ori seats are
reserved for people who represent others based on racial
commonalities. If Ma¯ori are characterized as a culture, then
theMa¯ori seats are filled by people who represent those who
share their cultural perspective. Yet justifying democratic
representation ensures that the question of how a represen-
tative is linked to constituents crops up outside the context
of debates about whether indigenous seats should exist or
not. The Ma¯ori presence in parliament affects any debate
about how to conceptualize either Ma¯ori or New Zealand
as a nation.
In asking about how the presence of Ma¯ori MPs shape
debates about national identity, I build on Phyllis Pease
Chock’s (1991) suggestion that a nation’s origin stories can
pose central dilemmas to people when they distinguish be-
tween legislative object and legislator. She examines the
1975 U.S. Congressional subcommittee hearings on immi-
gration to see how the U.S. myth of opportunity informs
debates about illegal migrants. The presence of people will-
ing to discuss their own families’ historical trajectories to
the United States altered the tone of the debate, under-
mining others’ attempts to address migrants only as leg-
islative objects (Chock 1991:281, 290). Reflecting on their
historical connections to this dilemma, the representatives
and expert witnesses made visible their own historically
nuanced relationship with the nation. In so doing, the U.S.
representativesmade their personal histories a basis for con-
necting with those they legislate. In short, representatives
often can reflect on their own cultural or historical connec-
tions as a rhetorical resource when arguing for particular
laws.
Just as in Chock’s study, when Ma¯ori MPs bring their
personal background into the debate, they often do so to
disrupt how those they represent are construed as legisla-
tive objects.24 Almost none of the Ma¯ori MPs use the “cul-
ture of” construction. Instead, when they speak about what
it means to be Ma¯ori, they tend to emphasize differences
of both social organization and epistemologies. These dif-
ferences are referred to, not explained or elaborated, in
accord with the tendency toward using second-order in-
dexicalities mentioned earlier. For example, Metiria Turei
(Green Party) argues for a change in tax law in the following
way:
We are pleased that the definition of “charitable pur-
pose” has been extended to include those who are re-
lated by blood. TraditionalMa¯ori structures that prioritise
wha¯nau [family] and hapu¯ [tribe] have had real difficulty
in gaining recognition as valid structures in our society.
Once defined as “beastly communism,” those structures
are actually fundamental to Ma¯ori cultural, economic,
and political development. The extension of the charita-
ble purposes definition goes some way towards ensuring
that Ma¯ori authorities and marae [meeting place] are no
longer prejudiced by inappropriate, culturally biased def-
initions. [New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, March 19,
2003, Metiria Turei MP; emphasis and definitions added]
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In this speech, Turei reminds her audience that both
Ma¯ori and current European New Zealand structures have
historical trajectories, before emphasizing the justice of rec-
ognizing and supporting Ma¯ori social structures. She and
other Ma¯ori MPs argue that the government should respect
the complexities of Ma¯ori culture and often refute other
legislators’ reductionist gestures toward Ma¯ori culture.
Even asMa¯oriMPs speak for and aboutwhat itmeans to
be Ma¯ori, they are also constantly being told by other Euro-
pean and Ma¯ori MPs how they should stand for Ma¯oriness.
In part, this reflects how people use language in parlia-
ment. Parliament is an arena in which people understand
that they are using language both to comment on the na-
tion and try to shape it. As a result, parliament is also an
arena of a particular form of explicitness: it is a laboratory
for metapragmatics in which people are constantly exper-
imenting with using reflexive language to move others to
legislate in the desired manner. In other words, people in
parliament are constantly telling each other what the world
should be like, how others should speak, and what others
should be.25
Intriguingly, given howmuch instruction is constantly
occurring in Parliament, Ma¯oriness is currently the only
identity category that inspires instruction. MPs are con-
stantly invoking Ma¯oriness and telling the Ma¯ori MPs on
the other side of the political divide that they should be true
to Ma¯ori interests instead of party interests. A close analy-
sis of parliamentary transcripts reveals that in one recent
year alone (2003), Ma¯ori MPs were informed 93 times what
it should mean for them to be Ma¯ori. For example, Gerry
Brownlee (National Party), in arguing against allowing MPs
to have dual citizenship, suggests how Ma¯ori MPs should
vote: “I want to ask the Ma¯ori members, particularly, how
comfortable they are with the idea that foreigners can sit in
this Parliament and determine their destiny—because that
is what they are voting for” (New Zealand, Parliamentary De-
bates, August 7, 2003, Gerry Brownlee MP). Recommending
that Ma¯ori members of another political party act differ-
ently is a common political strategy. Yet no MP suggests
that women or those of Asian descent in another politi-
cal party should legislate differently than other members
of their political party. Ma¯oriness is the only category that
seems to encourage this form of consociate education.
In short, the category of “Ma¯ori” is treated as politically
distinct in parliamentary contexts, as Ma¯ori MPs constantly
get told that behaving properly means going against their
party and acting in the interests of Ma¯oridom. For exam-
ple, the aforementioned Gerry Brownlee (National), prone
to telling Ma¯ori MPs how best to behave as Ma¯ori legisla-
tors, criticizes Pakura Horomia, the Minister of Ma¯ori Af-
fairs, for being too loyal to Labour, saying “he is a Minister
of Ma¯ori Affairs who is much more interested in using his
ministry to promote the best interests of the Labour Party
than he is in Ma¯ori interests” (New Zealand, Parliamentary
Debates, February 15, 2005, Gerry BrownleeMP). Other MPs
constantly tell Ma¯ori MPs both that there is a conflict be-
tween their party’s interests andMa¯ori interests, and that as
goodMa¯ori representatives, they should putMa¯ori interests
first. One might anticipate that this tendency would have
changed after the last election, when the newly formed
Ma¯ori Party won four seats. In some sense, the Ma¯ori Party
was established to circumvent this possible divide between
loyalties. The best interests of the Ma¯ori Party are meant to
be the best interests of Ma¯oridom as a whole. Yet members
of other parties still engage in this peculiar form of conso-
ciate education, telling members of the Ma¯ori Party how
they should vote if they want to vote for Ma¯ori interests. In
short, being a Ma¯ori legislator is understood as a category
that one can fail to perform properly because of multiple
loyalties. It is an identity category that inspires advice and
corrections like no other.
CONCLUSION
The New Zealand parliamentary debates between 2003 and
2006 provide a useful case study for exploring the con-
sequences of neoliberal perspectives for indigenous peo-
ple. One sees how neoliberal policies are transformed into
locally specific policies by turning to the ways in which,
during this period, the New Zealand political parties char-
acterized the indigenous Ma¯ori as either cultural or racial
but not both. Ma¯ori members of parliament, in turn, must
invent new strategies for representing their indigenous con-
stituents’ interests. This is a productive comparative exam-
ple as indigenous people globally seek to navigate the possi-
bilities and limitations enabled by the ways that neoliberal
regimes everywhere are redefining what it means to be a
culture bearer (Comaroff and Comaroff 2007).
Parliaments are, in part, arenas for contesting defini-
tions. Legislators determine how to carve up the world
through laws that result from debate and political com-
promise. What is intriguing about legislatures as arenas of
law is that explicitness has its own peculiar hazards in these
contexts. When a political party frames the need to redress
a social inequity, the grounds for how best to understand
this social inequity are immediately opened for debate.
In discussing Ma¯ori as a legislative object, historical injus-
tice competes with racial privilege as potential frames for
understanding the context. Precisely because legislative
structures promote contestation, when legislators introduce
definitions of difference, the definition itself frequently be-
comes a topic of debate. Once the law has passed, this
instability recedes into the background. But until the law
becomes stabilized as a text, people’s fundamental assump-
tions continually risk being challenged and changed. In
New Zealand/Aotearoa, being explicit about culture has af-
fected how parliamentarians address the culture bearers in
their midst.
In the New Zealand parliament, being explicit about
culture has gone hand in hand with attempts to con-
tain culture. Both political parties try to use neoliberal
logics to limit culture’s epistemological challenges, with
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parliament’s agonistic structure encouraging this effort to
become a political divide. Their debates centers not around
what culture is but whether culture as a skill set should be
a legislative object. Yet this is not a skill set that everyone
seems to possess equally. In making culture into a skill set,
these politicians are defining some people as cultural but
not others. Because of how the New Zealand parliament
is organized, there are members of parliament, indigenous
representatives, willing to disrupt others’ strategic use of
culture as containment. Ma¯ori MPs will use their personal
experiences as culture bearers to speak against this contain-
ment, even criticizing the New Zealand parliament itself as
a cultural arena. Pita Sharples, the coleader of the Ma¯ori
Party, explained: “These sittings have been somewhat of
a culture shock for three-quarters of the Ma¯ori Party, but
we are adjusting OK” (New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates,
December 15, 2005). With such statements, Maori MPs
skillfully put culture to the work of dismantling the con-
fines that their parliamentary colleagues try to build around
culture itself.
ILANA GERSHON Department of Communication and Culture,
Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405
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1. The historical scope of this article is limited to the period during
which Don Brash led New Zealand’s National Party.
2. The differences between the Ma¯ori and English versions of the
Treaty make it difficult to determine what Ma¯ori chiefs thought
they were signing in 1840.
3. Political scientists have been the most active in analyzing how
the politics of recognition is enacted in legislatures. They tend
to ask whether women have different leadership styles than men
(Thomas 1994), whether ethnic minorities are best served by rep-
resentatives of their own ethnicity (Coleman 1993), and whether
women or ethnic minorities benefit by having guaranteed propor-
tional representation (Htun 2004).
4. For an exception, see Bocarejo 2008.
5. This was not always the case. In 1975, when Ben Couch became
the onlyMa¯ori National MP, the other Ma¯ori MPs (all from Labour)
often criticized him for not being sufficiently Ma¯ori.
6. Members of the Ma¯ori Party often begin their speeches with a
few sentences in Ma¯ori.
7. At present, most Ma¯ori’s first language is English. The Ma¯ori
language is promoted in New Zealand through the educational
system as well as government supported Ma¯ori television and radio
stations.
8. Pita Sharples’s (Ma¯ori Party) maiden speech is a striking excep-
tion.
9. This emphasis on precontact culture is an institutionally struc-
tured view of indigeneity that emerges in the New Zealand par-
liament only when legislators discuss Ma¯ori as a judicial object.
In the following rare example, Michael Cullen (Labour) describes
how the courts will choose to apply a law under discussion:
The test is a high one. . . . Applicant groups must be
able to demonstrate that the use or activity is integral
to their culture and has been practiced substantially un-
interrupted since 1840. [New Zealand, Parliamentary De-
bates, July 27, 2004, Michael Cullen MP]
10. Ma¯ori members of parliaments are not the only ones in-
sisting that culture should not be static. Judy Turner, deputy
leader of United Future, claimed that “all cultures are dynamic
and responsive to phenomena, and often adjust over time”
(New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates, May 3, 2006, Judy Turner
MP).
11. For an analysis of corporate culture linked to ideas of diversity,
see Gordon 1995.
12. Most Ma¯ori mps are notable exceptions: they do not speak in
terms of “culture of.” Only New Zealand First Ma¯ori MPs will, in
line with their party’s stance that Ma¯ori should be held responsible
for their own successes and failures regardless of the structural
inequalities encountered.
13. It is beyond the scope of this article to lay out the historical
relationship between the National Party and its political allies con-
tributing to this stance on race. For an elegant analysis, see Barber
2008.
14. In 2003–04, the terms race-based laws, race-based policies, race-
based legislation, and similar turns of phrase were used approxi-
mately 286 times in parliamentary debates to describe the National
Party’s perspective.
15. Technically the acronym stands for Association of Consumers
and Taxpayers, but no one would recognize this version. It is
known as the ACT New Zealand party and it doesn’t even men-
tion the spelled-out version of its acronym on its website.
16. Although this speech did not take place in parliament, its
points were reiterated there by Brash and other National MPs
for months afterward. Readers familiar with New Zealand politics
might want to claim Don Brash’s speech initiated changes in how
the National Party characterizes Ma¯ori. However, MPs actively dis-
tinguished between Ma¯ori as a culture or a race for over a year
before Brash’s speech.
17. A characteristic of New Zealand neoliberalism that makes it
distinctly “first world” is that neoliberalism is not discussed as an
economic policy imposed from the outside.
18. Because Ma¯ori are cognatic, Brash’s argument also disregards
Ma¯ori principles of kinship.
19. Thanks to Janelle Taylor for this point.
20. See Gershon 2001 for a critique of this political stance.
21. Several members of parliament currently have degrees in an-
thropology, ranging from a BA to a Ph.D.
22. “Two-world view” refers to the existence of two distinct and
equally valid perspectives: a Ma¯ori perspective and a Crown per-
spective.
23. This take on culture also encourages governments to require
cultural mediators. See Gershon 2006 for a critique of government
reliance on cultural mediators.
24. Being racial, and thus acultural, as the National Party advo-
cated, was simply not a viable option for Ma¯ori MPs. When Brash
began espousing this political argument, Ma¯ori politicians in his
party, such as Georgina te Heuheu, made it clear they could not
support National’s new stance.
25. My thanks to Herve´ Varenne for this methodological impulse.
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